17. I remain unconvinced that the number and area of claims in “shock” cases would be substantially increased or enlarged were the respondents here held liable. that there is a duty but, as a matter of policy, the consequences of breach of it ought to be limited at a certain point, or whether, with Griffiths L.J one says that the fact that consequences may be foreseeable does not automatically impose a duty of care, does not do so in fact where policy indicates the contrary. Griffiths L.J. It was based, soundly, upon “direct perception of some of the events which go to make up the accident as an entire event, and this includes… the immediate aftermath…” (p. 880). I turn to consider the sole basis upon which the Court of Appeal dismissed the claim, that of public policy. My Lords looking back I think it is possible to discern that there only ever were two clear lines of limitation of a defendants liability for “nervous shock” for which any rational justification could be advanced in the light of both of the state of the law of negligence and the state of medical science as judicially understood at the time when those limitation were propounded. The Court of Appeal rejected McLoughlin's appeal on grounds of public policy. As her cause of action is based on shock it is only foresight of shock which is relevant. 912], para 26, Wagner v. International Railway Co. [(1921) 232 N.Y. 176, 180] para 26, Anns v. Merton London Borough Council {[1978] A.C. 728, 752},para 29, Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. {[1964] A.C. 465, 536} para 29, Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas [13 App. References: [1983] 1 AC 410, [1982] 2 All ER 298, [1982] UKHL 3, [1982] 2 WLR 982 Links: Bailii Coram: Lord Wilberforce, Lord Bridge, Lord Scarman Ratio: The plaintiff was the mother of a child who died in an horrific accident, in which her husband and two other children were also injured. She suffered psychiatric injury, including clinical depression and personality changes, after witnessing her family's situation in the hospital. NEGLIGENCE – PSYCHIATRIC DAMAGE – FORESEEABILITY – IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF TRAUMATIC EVENT. A search was mounted which continued for some hours. Where the defendant has represented him- or herself as having more than average skills and abilities, that is as a professional "as all doctors do", this test expects standards which must be in accordance with a responsible body of opinion, even if others differ in opinion. Since he wrote, the type of damage has, in this country at least, become more familiar and less deterrent to recovery. The appellant ’s husband, Thomas McLoughlin, and three of her children, George, aged 17, Kathleen, aged 7 and Gillian, nearly 3, were in a Ford motor car: George was driving. But I am by no means sure that the result is socially desirable. The plaintiff claimed damages for “nervous shock”. 40, 42], as “settled law,” namely that “…damages can be given for nervous shock caused by the sight of an accident, at any rate to a close relative.”. Yet an anxiety neurosis or a reactive depression may be recognizable psychiatric illness, with or without psychosomatic symptoms. But, these discounts accepted there remains, in my opinion, just because “shock” in its nature is capable of affecting so wide a range of people, a real need for the law to place some limitation upon the extent of admissible claims. 3d 1316]. The claimant’s husband and three of her children were involved in a serious road traffic accident in which their car was struck by a lorry due to the negligence of the defendant lorry driver. The appellant subsequently brought proceedings against the respondents. She sees in the paper a photograph of unidentifiable victims trapped on the top floor waving for help from the windows. 11. 429]. 9. The suffering of the patient from the latter are no less real and frequently no less painfull and disabling than from the former. I do not, of course, use the word “negligent” as prejudging the question whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty, but I do use the word “foreseeably” as connoting the normally accepted criterion of such a duty. 5. This case is frequently examined by law students and students of legal philosophy. 5. According to a survey in The Journal of Legal Studies, Dworkin was the second most-cited American legal scholar of the twentieth century. No … held that the injury by nervous shock to the appellant was “readily foreseeable” but that the respondents owed no duty of care to the appellant. I think that it is now too late to do so. But when causation it fact is in issue, it must no doubt be determined by the judge on the basis of the evidence of psychiatrists. This case was unique at the time because the claimant suffered injuries away from the scene of the accident and hours after the accident occurred. 3. 146] para 26, Chadwick v. British Railways Board [(1967) 1 W.L.R. OK, Liste der Fallbeispiele in der Rechtswissenschaft. expressly held that the fact that the plaintiff was in an upstairs room 80 yards away from the scene of the accident was immaterial. It recognizes them as normal. A fourth child, Michael then aged 11, was a passenger in a following motor car driven by Mr. Pilgrim: this car did not become involved in the accident. Whatever is the correct jurisprudential analysis, it does not make any essential difference whether one says, with Stephenson L.J. But the lawyer still has to inquire whether, in so doing, he has crossed some critical line behind which he ought to stop. He then drove her to Addenbrooke’s Hospital Cambridge. And in Benson v. Lee [(1972) VR 879], a situation existed with some similarity to the present case. I believe that the “floodgates” argument, however, is, as it always has been, greatly exaggerated. Subject to the next paragraph, there is no English case in which a plaintiff has been able to recover nervous shock damages where the injury to the near relative occurred out of sight and earshot of plaintiff. 10. Secondly, consider the plaintiff who is unrelated to the victims of the relevant accident. English tort law concerns the compensation for harm to people's rights to health and safety, a clean environment, property, their economic interests, or their reputations. I accept, of course, the importance of the factors indicated in the guidelines suggested by Tobriner J. in Dillon v. Legg, as bearing upon the degree of foreseeability of the plaintiff’s psychiatric illness. He saw the appellant and started sobbing. But, thirdly, in so far as policy considerations can be seen to have influenced any of the decisions, they appear to have sprung from the fear that to cross the chosen line would be to open the floodgates to claims without limit and largely without merit. she then suffered psychiatric injury, including clinical depression and personality changes prior to witnessing her family's situation in the hospital. He drove her to the hospital where she was told one child was dead, and saw her husband and two other children seriously injured, covered in oil and mud. 599, 614 that the ambit of duty of care owed by a motorist is restricted to persons “on or near the highway at or near the time or near to it who may be directly affected by the bad driving. in the instant case (1981) Q.B. 16th Jul 2019 It is safe to say that this, in general terms is understood by the ordinary man or woman who is hypothesised by the courts in situations where claims for negligence are made. On 19 October 1973, a friend came to the claimant's (plaintiff's) house to tell her of a serious accident involving her husband and three children two hours after it had occurred. In tort law, a duty of care is a legal obligation which is imposed on an individual requiring adherence to a standard of reasonable care while performing any acts that could foreseeably harm others. I cannot for a moment doubt the correctness of his conclusion that the mother’s mental illness was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. 22. 1] para 19, Abramzik v. Brenner [(1967) 65 D.L.R. C, who was home at the time, was informed of the accident at around 6 p.m. by a neighbour, who drove her to hospital to see her family. 46. Bridge was the presiding judge at the trial of the Birmingham six in 1975, the verdict of which was quashed by the Court of… …   Wikipedia, Richard Wilberforce, Baron Wilberforce — Richard Orme Wilberforce, Baron Wilberforce, PC (11 March 1907 ndash; 15 February 2003) was a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in the House of Lords from 1964 to 1982.Richard Wilberforce was a great great grandson of William Wilberforce, the famous… …   Wikipedia, Revolution on Ice — Infobox Album | Name = Revolution On Ice Type = Album Artist = Gumball Released = 1994 Recorded = 1994 Genre = Alternative rock, Indie rock Length = 35:51 Label = Columbia Producer = Don Fleming and John Agnello Reviews = *Allmusic Rating|3|5… …   Wikipedia, Fälle in der Rechtswissenschaft — In der Rechtswissenschaft werden zahlreiche Rechtsprobleme anhand fiktiver oder tatsächlicher Fälle erörtert. para 33, (Practice Statement: Judicial Precedent [1966] I W.L.R. The appellant was then taken to see George. 44. 1234) para 35, Marshall v. Lionel Enterprises Inc. [(1971) 25 DLR (3d) 141], para 39, Dillon v. Legg, [29 A.L.R. If rigidly applied, an exclusion of liability to him would have defeated the plaintiff’s claim in Chadwick v. British Railways Board. The duty of care may be imposed by operation of law between individuals who have no current direct relationship but eventually become related in some manner, as defined by common law. 35. She reads in her morning newspaper that it has been the scene of a disastrous fire. This was a case from New South Wales and I cannot help wondering whether it was not the manifest injustice of the result which led, a few years later, to the intervention of the New South Wales legislature, to enable the parent, husband or wife of a person “killed, injured or put in peril” by another’s negligence to recover damages for “mental or nervous shock” irrespective of any spatial or temporal relationship to the accident in which the death, injury or peril occurred (New South Wales Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944, section 4(1).